Hoofdzetel Euroclear in Brussel - foto Euroclear
Hoofdzetel Euroclear in Brussel.jpg

Once again, voices are rising to transfer the 195 billion euro in Russian assets frozen at Brussels-based securities depository Euroclear into a European investment vehicle. But within the Belgian camp, there’s growing concern that doing so would open Pandora’s box.

As of the end of March 2025, Euroclear is holding 195 billion euro in Russian assets immobilized due to international sanctions imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. These assets mainly consist of bonds and other investments held by the Russian central bank. In the first quarter alone, the frozen funds generated 1.47 billion euro in interest income. As more of the securities mature, the share of cash in the portfolio is steadily increasing.

Confiscation

According to news outlet Politico, EU institutions have been circulating a proposal in recent weeks to transfer the Russian assets into a new investment fund. The idea is that such a fund could generate higher returns by placing the frozen assets into riskier investments.

This isn’t the first time such a scenario has surfaced. The idea of simply confiscating the Russian funds and using them to support Ukraine has been floated repeatedly, but major EU countries—and Belgium in particular—still view that as a step too far. The UK, meanwhile, introduced a variation in March: placing the Russian assets into a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which could serve as a stepping stone to eventual confiscation.

That SPV scenario appears to be gaining traction again—this time without explicitly linking it to future seizure. Still, it raises many unresolved questions, according to those familiar with the matter. Who would manage the assets? What return targets would they be expected to meet? What happens if the investments underperform or post losses? And in the event of a peace agreement: how would the immediate return of funds to the Russian central bank and other Russian entities be handled?

The goose that lays the golden eggs

The Belgian government believes the current structure should be left untouched. That setup was agreed multilaterally in 2022 and refined in May 2024. At that point, the European Commission required Euroclear to forward certain profits from reinvestments to the EU, which could then use the proceeds to support Ukraine. In total, Euroclear transferred 3.5 billion euro into the EU’s Ukraine support fund. The Zelensky government is now pushing for the entire 195 billion euro to be moved into that fund.

But Belgian Prime Minister Bart De Wever (N-VA) opposes the idea. “I support keeping things as they are. We have the goose that lays the golden eggs. I suggest we hold onto it,” he said in Parliament on June 11. “If we’re going to serve the goose, let it be at the end of the dinner. That is, once a peace agreement has been reached and we have a multilateral decision, backed by the international community—and accepted by Russia.”

“If we’re going to serve the goose, let it be at the end of the dinner. So once a peace deal is in place, accepted by Russia.”

Bart De Wever, Prime Minister of Belgium

Whether through outright confiscation or a politically imposed transfer into an SPV, either move could severely damage Euroclear’s reputation as a neutral international service provider, experts warn. China, for instance, might break ties with Euroclear altogether and fast-track its plans to create its own international clearinghouse.

The worst-case scenario, they say, would be transferring the assets into an SPV while leaving legal liability with Euroclear—potentially exposing the Brussels-based institution to years of lawsuits and international claims. “Whatever the political decision may be, the legal framework is critically important. We can’t stress that enough,” Euroclear stated.

A Lehman moment

Both Euroclear CEO Valérie Urbain and Prime Minister De Wever have warned that expropriating the funds could trigger systemic risk across the eurozone.

“How will countries that hold their reserves in Europe—especially in Belgium—respond if politicians suddenly declare, ‘These aren’t yours anymore, we’re seizing them because you’re involved in a conflict’?” De Wever asked in Parliament. “Those countries will say, ‘In that case, we’re pulling our money out.’ That would create a systemic risk for the euro, and the legal risks for our country are enormous.” He noted that the UK, as a non-eurozone country, has fewer incentives to consider these consequences.

At the Portfolio Day event in Brussels, financial expert Jan Longeval described the possible confiscation of the Russian funds as “a potential Lehman moment” for the bond markets.

The think tank International Crisis Group emphasizes that the immobilized Russian assets remain a crucial European bargaining chip in any future peace negotiations. “Working with the Europeans might not appeal to everyone in a future Trump administration, but if the goal is peace in Ukraine, the financial reality is that there’s no alternative,” the group stated in an analysis.

Proponents of maintaining the status quo argue that handing all the Russian funds to Ukraine would remove that strategic leverage. Still, some geopolitical strategists believe Russian President Vladimir Putin has already written off the 195 billion euro and no longer counts on recovering it.

July 31 deadline

A key deadline is fast approaching. On July 31, EU heads of state and government must decide on the semiannual renewal of sanctions against Russia—a decision that, in principle, must be unanimous. That means the two EU countries currently closest to the Kremlin—Hungary and Slovakia—must also agree.

For advocates of the SPV scenario, the uncertainty surrounding this biannual renewal process is one more reason to speed up the transfer of the Russian assets at Euroclear—to prevent the funds from being suddenly released. Nevertheless, expectations are that unanimity will again be reached, either through side deals with the holdout countries or through deft diplomatic maneuvering, as in past renewals.

Euroclear and the Belgian treasury
Euroclear and the Belgian state are deeply intertwined. Belgium holds a nearly 13 percent strategic stake in the financial institution, as does (indirectly) the French government. The Russian assets also matter directly to Belgium’s treasury, as Euroclear pays corporate taxes on the profits they generate. In the first quarter of this year, Euroclear posted 495 million euro in profit from the Russian assets, resulting in 360 million euro in tax liability. Most of those “exceptional” tax revenues are being used by Belgium for bilateral aid to Ukraine.

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