In 1972, Richard Nixon flew to Beijing convinced that the world was becoming multipolar. He sought to position the United States as one of several great powers, strong enough to balance the Soviet Union and other emerging rivals. What he could not foresee was that his visit would instead mark the beginning of a unipolar era defined by unprecedented American dominance.
On May 14, Donald Trump travels to Beijing with a very different ambition: the deliberate creation of a bipolar world. History suggests that statesmen rarely get the world they envision.
This marks the first visit by an American president to China since Trump’s own state visit in 2017. At the time, Beijing rolled out the red carpet, treating him to a private tour of the Forbidden City and a traditional Peking opera performance. Much has changed since then, not least because of the trade war that Trump and Xi Jinping sought to contain through a deal reached during a personal meeting in Busan in October 2025. Reflecting the cooler atmosphere, the current visit has been cut back to just two days.
The very fact that the summit is taking place suggests that the outlines of an agreement are already in place. Top leaders only meet once their staffs have done the heavy lifting. Together, the United States and China account for roughly 44 percent of the global economy, up from 28 percent when globalization began accelerating in the 1970s. It is precisely this deep interdependence that turns a trade war into a contest no one can truly win. For “Chimerica,” the struggle becomes less about victory than about who can limit the damage most effectively. Washington’s national security establishment regards China as the most formidable challenge the United States has ever faced, yet Trump is seeking not confrontation, but a deal.
Trump has invited senior executives from Nvidia, Apple, ExxonMobil, Boeing, and Citigroup to accompany him. Beijing is reportedly negotiating a massive order for 500 Boeing 737 Max aircraft, which, if finalized, would mark China’s first major Boeing purchase since 2017. Washington is also pressing for Chinese commitments to buy 25 million tons of soybeans annually over the next three years, alongside increased imports of American poultry, beef, coal, oil, and natural gas. If China also agrees to major investment pledges, the total value of the package could surpass the $550 billion Japan committed under its own trade agreement with the United States.
China holds an important trump card: rare earth minerals. Beijing can offer the United States a stable, long-term commercial arrangement guaranteeing access to rare earths and magnets. There also appears to be some room for easing U.S. export controls on semiconductors, although pressure from Congress to limit concessions remains intense.
At the same time, the war in Iran is casting a shadow over the summit. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil supply normally passes, poses a direct threat to the Chinese economy. Washington has even urged Beijing to use its diplomatic leverage with Tehran. As the largest purchaser of Iranian oil, China does wield a degree of influence over Iran, though that influence is far from unlimited.
Taiwan remains the most sensitive issue. Beijing regards the island as part of its sovereign territory, and China’s foreign minister this week described it as the greatest risk to the bilateral relationship. Trump appears to be taking a less hardline position than his predecessors. An $11 billion U.S. weapons package for Taiwan has reportedly been put on hold ahead of the summit, partly because of the stance of Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang party, which maintains closer ties with Beijing. China, in turn, may press Washington to adopt a softer position on Taiwanese independence.
For investors, this summit carries enormous significance. Successful trade negotiations would reduce the tail risks that markets have been pricing in since 2025. Every step toward normalization lowers the risk premium weighing on Chinese and broader Asian markets. A deal that leads to larger Chinese purchases of American commodities and energy could also provide short-term support for the dollar through improved trade flows.
At the macro level, three possible scenarios are beginning to emerge. The first is a bipolar world in which the United States and China jointly shape the global order. This could resemble a new Cold War, or alternatively evolve into a more cooperative G-2 arrangement in which both powers set aside some of their differences and effectively dominate the international system together. Trump has occasionally used this kind of G-2 rhetoric over the past year, and such an outcome would likely be the most favorable for financial markets.
The second scenario is a return to unipolarity, although China has arguably already become too large for such a system to be sustainable. The third is a multipolar world, in which strategic rivalry between Washington and Beijing creates space for “middle powers” such as India, Brazil, Turkey, and the European Union to expand their own influence.
In a multipolar world, investors may have reason to be optimistic about these emerging centers of power and the markets that could benefit from a more fragmented global order. In a bipolar world, by contrast, optimism would likely be concentrated on the G-2 itself.
Nixon thought in multipolar terms and ended up ushering in a unipolar era. Trump thinks in bipolar terms. History suggests that he, too, will have only limited control over the eventual outcome.
Han Dieperink is chief investment officer at Auréus Vermogensbeheer. Earlier in his career, he served as chief investment officer at Rabobank and Schretlen & Co.
Han Dieperink is chief investment officer at Auréus Vermogensbeheer. Earlier in his career, he served as chief investment officer at Rabobank and Schretlen & Co.